

Draft Resolution:

Forum: GA6 Legal

Question of: Third-Party Interference During a Democratic Vote

Main Submitter: New Zealand

Co-Submitters: India, Iraq, Saudi Arabia

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 6,

Fully alarmed by the increasing chances of exposure to political election interference through both global social media communication and international financial connections since 2016,

Deeply concerned about the effects from the election results from the influences of the third-party interference during a democratic vote,

Bearing in mind the causes of political election interruptions include crucial electoral rules that have been breached, such as provisions on the transparency of campaign financing, with allegations of political spending by non-profit organizations from third-country sources,

Noting further that political election interferences come in a variety of forms such as disinformation campaigns on social media, cyber-attacks targeting the critical election infrastructures, and direct/indirect financial support,

Deeply conscious of the highly dangerous nature of Russian propaganda, as well as the growing number of disinformation cases that has doubled over the past year,

- 1) Requests government officials to be more active during the upcoming elections to decrease third party involvement effectiveness, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a) regularly provide up-to-date information about the elections and the candidates to reduce the effectiveness of misinformation,
 - b) officials should seek to escalate any concerns through the standard National Security System escalation process when suspecting specific foreign interference activity or a cybersecurity incident or if there were any credible or reasonable allegations of either that may significantly impact public confidence and threaten the General Election process,
 - c) remind national data protection authorities to make full use of their powers to investigate data protection infringements and to establish suitable sanctions and penalties;

- 2) Strongly urges the limitation of foreign financial support for funding advertisement during elections to reduce the power of voting result influences, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a) banning foreign donations from over the U.S. \$50,
 - b) requiring the names and addresses of those funding election advertisements in all mediums to be published,
 - c) establishing international funds transfers and domestic high value cash transaction monitoring to enable track and trace along high-risk money trails,
 - d) increasing the share of financial intelligence, such as through providing greater access for agencies to trace suspicious transaction data for data matching,
 - e) emphasizing the importance of supporting public service media to not rely financially on private financing sources to provide high-quality and impartial information to the general public;

- 3) Calls for increased social, political, and financial surveillance, not only on social media but also in community nations during elections to avoid state disinformation manipulation, which could lead to possible crowd uproars and miscommunication, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a) tracking down funds and information about the third party to get intel on them and their partners,
 - b) investigating the origins of online posts from foreign interferences, and reach out to social media platforms to ask them to inform viewers about the misleading information, in such ways but not limited to:
 - i) the usage of artificial intelligence and softwares to pick out any sensitive topics and misleading information that may lead to misinformation,
 - ii) the addition of watermarks or warnings for the viewers,
 - iii) the encouragement for viewers to report deceptive posts to the team, to quickly inform the people about the specific misinformation,
 - c) increasing the monitoring over social media platforms for any cyberattacks from prior political power individuals or companies and foreign power that have been involved in previous elections or important decisions noticed worldwide,
 - d) investigating suspected foreign interference or cybersecurity threats immediately through a swift and effective response, followed by classified intelligence,
 - e) administering the security clearance system which helps to protect the nations' government against the risks of insider threat,
 - f) prioritizing security agencies' efforts on the areas of greatest national defense interest to the government especially during General Elections,
 - g) collaboration between agencies to work together to ensure any issues related to managing misleading or inaccurate information about the General Election and

referendums are directed to the most appropriate agency based on their existing functions and powers,

- h) keeping key stakeholders and relevant agencies informed of activities concerning threats or apparent threats to the electoral process to the greatest extent possible and appropriate,
 - i) emphasizing the important role of whistle-blowers as a safeguard of democracy and governance when disclosing information in the public interest;
- 4) Calls upon member states to involve their communities in participating in directing awareness in the issue of third party interference, and the steps communities can take to help prevent these issues from happening, in ways such as but not limited to:
- a) increase the proactive cooperation from sectors of society such as the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, social media platforms, civil society and researchers, and reporters to increase chances of campaign bad actors to be caught early,
 - b) encourage service providers and platforms to counter disinformation, and increase the transparency of electoral advertising on social media in the Code of Practice,
 - c) include specific courses on media literacy in their school curricula, and develop information campaigns targeted at the segments of the population that are more vulnerable to disinformation,
 - d) continue supporting and fostering responsible journalism and editorial responsibility in both the traditional and the new media in facing the challenge of non-verified or one-sided tendentious information undermining citizens' trust in independent media,
 - e) support public institutions, think-tanks, NGOs, and grassroots cyberactivists that are working on issues of propaganda and disinformation,
 - f) make funding and support available for public awareness-raising campaigns aimed at increasing the resilience of citizens to disinformation;
- 5) Encourages Election Commissions to set policies and reminders to allow security agencies to be obligated to prosecute proper countermeasures against third party interference in ways such as but not limited to:
- a) require agencies to be politically neutral, that the Directors-General must regularly consult the Leader of the Opposition, and that the exercise of a person's freedom of expression does not of itself justify an intelligence and security agency taking any action in respect of that person,
 - b) set out the principles and processes that will guide any response to a foreign interference or cybersecurity threat to the electoral process in advance to protect security agencies from any perception reflecting political party's interests or undermine the free and fair conduct of the democratic process,

- c) develop and provide information and cyber assessments records on the intentions, activities, and capabilities of threat actors, including in relation to the General Election process to easily identify and respond to future threats or potential threats,
 - d) allow security services should only access the data and systems necessary to provide those services, and are authorized to apply technical measures to protect any personal and other confidential material obtained when warranted;
- 6) Recommends national security to provide political election candidates and government officials, and whistle-blowers with the necessary accommodations during elections to prepare them for possible forms of election interference attacks, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a) providing cybersecurity and information assurance services and advice to authorized individuals and entities,
 - b) providing protective security services, advice, and assistance to a wide range of individuals and entities, including Members of Parliament, Ministers, and election candidates and whistle-blowers,
 - c) requiring agencies to provide government officials and political candidates with preparatory protective security and cybersecurity briefings and threat briefings to equip them for possible interference threats;
- 7) Proposes to set international penalties for interference with the results of democratic votes from a third party, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a) finding appropriate amounts regarding the amount of damage done to interfere with the election,
 - b) banning/suspending any social media accounts that have been spreading false information or leaking personal information about a candidate to disparage a political candidate,
 - c) charging against civil society activists as a position built on “misleading” information can affect the view of a party;
- 8) Strongly supports the improvement of safeguards in systems and processes used by election officials to tabulate votes and certify official results to guarantee security, as well as to relay more accurate voting results, in ways such as but not limited to:
 - a) safeguards should include measures that help ensure tabulation systems function as intended, protect against malicious software, and enable the identification and correction of any irregularities,
 - b) have officials in charge of tabulating the ballot votes revisit counted votes to make sure to avoid accidents such as:

- i) having a county clerk not update the software that counts the physical results,
 - ii) over/under-recording the actual number of votes,
 - iii) failure to properly combine the correctly counted ballots with the election management system software before submitting a report of the official results,
 - c) reexamine counted votes to verify the actual numbers of votes for each candidate to make sure none were forcibly switched, voted under the name of a deceased citizen, or counted votes that were found to be fraud;
- 9) Asks the nations' Election Commissions to document political election interference cases in detail to compare old and new outcomes, as it compensates in the actions and reattempt of such cases:
- a) considering the possibilities of finding new solutions to prevent further interruption or repetition of the same interruption methods, in which:
 - i) evaluate possible legislative and non-legislative actions, which can result in intervention by social media platforms to:
 - (1) systematically labeling content shared by bot,
 - (2) review algorithms to make them as unbiased as possible,
 - b) developing a better understanding of recurring trends and events in order to develop and restraint these interventions,
 - c) establishing a method of preventing interference by coming together so as to achieve an agreement of a fair and undisturbed democratic voting process.